Laurie Calhoun's We Kill Because We Can delivers a fierce -if confused -indictment of American militarism in general, and of targeted killing by drone more specifically. The introduction seems to suggest the book is very specifically about how the appearance of drones has institutionalised extrajudicial killing as a 'standard operating procedure' (p. 14). Yet, throughout the book, Calhoun frequently digresses to attack American warmaking in general, launching broadsides against the claims of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) presence in Iraq that led to the Iraq War. As such, it is hard to sense what this book is about, as arguments about drones, collateral damage, the American propensity for violence, the military-industrial complex, intelligence failures, suicide rates among veterans, and so on are intertwined, often raised and dropped, and collated without any apparent structure. While the book is divided in three sections with slightly different foci, arguments are repeated from chapter to chapter almost identically, hampering any sense of argumentative progression. Thus, the good arguments she makes -about the redefinition of 'pre-emption', the lack of oversight and due process, the replacement of extraordinary rendition by extraordinary killing and so on -are drowned out and left undeveloped.
A few arguments recur throughout the book, most notably the thesis that the practice of targeted killing encourages civilians to radicalise and take up arms. Yet, Calhoun states it as a hypothetical ('their family and other community members may become more sympathetic to groups such as Al-Qaeda and the Taliban', p. 236 (emphasis added)), and does not engage with any literature on radicalisation or provide evidence. Similarly, she derides the intelligence underpinning the drone program as inexact, flawed by extensive bias and error. However, her two arguments here are essentially that past intelligence failures (such as the Iraq WMD failure) and the use of paid informers mean that no intelligence can ever be taken to be accurate (pp. 15-16). While criticisms of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) intelligence gathering, overconfidence, and bias are apt, Calhoun stretches this to an absurd extent, without concrete evidence. Finally, on just war theory, Calhoun similarly uses simplistic notions ('if the 2003 invasion of Iraq was illegal, then every single person killed in the conflict was the victim of a war crime', p. 168) without any engagement with Just War theorists. Much of the ethical discussion of targeted killing relies on superficial analogies -the mafia, Nazi Germany, Nidal Hasan (the Fort Hood shooter), George Zimmermann and Trayvon Martin, 9/11 -rather than substantive discussion of the complex ethical issues at hand or the ethical transformations brought about by drone warfare. In summary, scholars looking for a substantive critique of the ethics of targeted killing and American militarism will do well to look elsewhere.
Emil Archambault (University of Durham)
